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Abstract: 
We study the effects of voluntary participation on cooperation in collective action problems. 
Voluntary participation may foster cooperation through a mechanism of assortative selection of 
interaction partners based on false consensus bias, or through a mechanism whereby the decision 
to not participate can be used as a threat against free-riders. We examine the effectiveness of 
these mechanisms in a one-shot public goods experiment. Voluntary participation has a positive 
effect on provision only through the threat of non-participation. Assortative selection of 
interaction partners seems to play a minor role in our setting, whereas the threat of non-
participation is a powerful force to discipline free-riding. 
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Collective action is at the heart of many activities of vital importance for human societies. 
However, many groups fall prey to free-riding incentives and struggle to foster and sustain 
cooperation (Olson, 1965; Dietz et al., 2003). Thus, the success of human cooperation relies on 
the effectiveness of mechanisms and institutions designed to restrain free-riding and promote 
cooperation (e.g., Rand and Nowak, 2013). A substantial amount of research has been devoted to 
the study of such mechanisms and institutions. Several authors have shown that cooperation can 
be sustained by (in)direct reciprocity and reputational spill-overs, if the prospects of future 
interactions are non-negligible (e.g., Roth and Murnighan, 1978; Dal Bó, 2005). Altruistic 
punishment and rewards have also been shown to effectively promote cooperation (e.g., Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000; Sefton et al., 2007). In this paper, we study an alternative mechanism to 
reciprocity, reputation, punishment and rewards: voluntary participation to collective action. 
Voluntary participation is a nearly ubiquitous characteristic of real-world social 
interactions: in many naturally occurring environments individuals can freely decide whether or 
not to partner with others to engage in cooperative endeavors. Voluntary associations, 
collectives, community groups, and collaborative institutions are typical real-world examples of 
organizations facing collective action problems where agents have the freedom to join in, or opt 
out from, participating in the common endeavors. And indeed voluntary participation is 
sometimes invoked to explain the relative success of such groups in solving collective actions 
dilemmas (e.g., Lin, 1990, and the symposium articles featured in the Journal of Comparative 
Economics – vol. 17, issue 2 – for a discussion of the role of voluntary participation in Chinese 
agricultural collectives in 1959-1961). However, while there is a consensus that voluntary 
participation may foster cooperation, little is known about the mechanisms underlying this effect. 
The aim of this study is to contribute filling this gap in the literature by investigating the potential 
mechanisms that may make voluntary participation conducive to cooperation. 
We focus on two specific mechanisms that have received substantial attention especially in 
the theoretical literature on voluntary participation. On the one hand, some authors have argued 
that the positive effects of voluntary participation may operate through a mechanism of 
assortative matching: the fact that participation in groups is not forced but voluntary may trigger 
a process of self-selection into groups that favors the inclusion of cooperators and the exclusion 
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of free-riders. The literature has proposed different ways in which this process of assortative 
matching may arise. For instance, some authors have suggested that cooperators may have 
observable characteristics (“green beards”) that distinguish them from free-riders (e.g., Frank, 
1987; 1988; Amann and Yang, 1998). If individuals are free to decide whether or not to enter 
into partnerships with others, they may use these observable characteristics to avoid partnerships 
with free-riders and favor partnerships with cooperators. Other models have instead proposed 
that assortative matching may be the result of a “false consensus bias”, whereby individuals tend 
to project their own cooperative attitudes onto others (Ross et al., 1977).1 If individuals suffer 
from a false consensus bias, cooperators will be more optimistic about the prospects of 
cooperation, and may thus be more likely than free-riders to join others in cooperative endeavors 
(e.g., Orbell and Dawes, 1991; Macy and Skvoretz, 1998). 
On the other hand, another strand of literature emphasizes a different mechanism: when 
participation is voluntary individuals are free to walk away from either potential or existing 
partnerships, and this can be used as a sanctioning device to discipline free-riders. Again, the 
existing literature suggests different possible mechanisms whereby this may happen. In some 
models, the possibility to quit partnerships is beneficial to cooperation simply because it allows 
cooperators who are willing to walk away from their partners, to avoid repeated interactions with 
free-riders and to reap instead the benefits of repeated interactions with other like-minded 
cooperators (e.g., Aktipis, 2004). Other authors emphasize instead the fact that the dissolution of 
partnerships may impose costs on all parties involved (e.g., Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara, 
2009; Izquierdo et al., 2010; Schumacher, 2013; Izquierdo et al., 2014). This gives group 
members a means to resist exploitation by free-riders, as the threat of costly exits may discipline 
opportunistic behavior and prevent free-riding. 
Despite the many theoretical arguments proposing that voluntary participation may foster 
cooperation, only a few empirical studies (reviewed below) have so far examined the effects of 
voluntary participation on cooperation. Moreover, none of these studies have compared the 
relative effectiveness of the mechanisms outlined above in promoting cooperation. In this paper, 
                                           
1 Several experimental studies have found evidence that individuals suffer from a false consensus bias across a 
variety of settings (e.g., Offerman et al., 1996; Selten and Ockenfels, 1998; Charness and Grosskopf, 2001; Heijden 
et al., 2007; Gächter et al., 2012; Blanco et al., 2014). For a discussion of whether the consensus effect is “truly” 
false, see Engelmann and Strobel (2000) and Engelmann and Strobel (2012). 
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we present a one-shot, two-person public goods game experiment designed to disentangle the 
effects on cooperation of voluntary participation operating either through a mechanism of 
assortative matching based on false consensus bias or through a mechanism whereby the decision 
not to participate can be used as a threat against free-riding. To disentangle these effects, we 
contrast three treatments: a Baseline treatment, with forced participation in the public goods 
game; an Unconditional voluntary participation treatment (‘Unconditional treatment,’ 
henceforth) where at the beginning of the game players choose between an outside option payoff 
and participation in the public goods game; and a Conditional voluntary participation treatment 
(‘Conditional treatment,’ henceforth) where, after interacting in the public goods game and pre-
committing to a contribution, players can opt out of the game and secure an outside option 
payoff.  
The key design difference between the Unconditional and Conditional treatments hinges on 
the information available to players when deciding whether to participate in the game: in the 
Conditional treatment players can condition their participation decision on the pre-committed 
contributions (which will of course be implemented only if players do not opt out of the game); 
thus, voluntary participation can be used as a sanctioning device since players can (tacitly) 
threaten to walk away from potential partnerships with free-riders. In contrast, in the 
Unconditional treatment the participation decision is made unconditionally (i.e., without 
receiving any information about contribution decisions) and cannot thus be used as a sanctioning 
device. However, voluntary participation may still be beneficial if cooperative types self-select 
into the game more often than free-riders. In order to study the role of false consensus bias in 
triggering this assortative matching effect, in all treatments the public goods game was preceded 
by a sequential two-player prisoner’s dilemma game which we use to measure subjects’ 
cooperative types and optimism about cooperation.  
Our results show that voluntary participation can have a strong, positive effect on 
cooperation. However, this positive effect is only observed in the Conditional treatment, whereas 
in the Unconditional treatment voluntary participation does not have an effect on cooperation. 
These findings point to the crucial relevance of the sanctioning mechanism in fostering 
cooperation in collective action situations. The effectiveness of this mechanism lies in the threat-
value of voluntary participation: in our experiment subjects who decide not to participate do so 
mainly to retaliate against free-riders. Subjects seem to anticipate this effect, and this generally 
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increases contributions. In contrast, the assortative matching mechanism does not have much bite 
in our experiment. This is not because our subjects are not affected by a false consensus bias: in 
fact, we observe a significant false consensus effect in our data. Rather, the assortative matching 
mechanism is unsuccessful because in our experiment decisions to enter the public goods game 
do not seem to depend on subjects’ cooperation types or their optimism about cooperation.  
Our paper contributes to the study of mechanisms and institutions that can help groups 
overcome collective action dilemmas. We show that the institution of voluntary participation can 
substantially increase cooperation, and may thus be either an effective substitute or complement 
for other mechanisms based – for instance – on reciprocity, reputation, direct punishment, and 
rewards. As such, our paper directly contributes to the small experimental literature on the effects 
of voluntary participation in social dilemmas.2 Ehrhart and Keser (1999) were among the first to 
study the effects of voluntary participation on public good provision. In their experiment, 
subjects are initially assigned to public good groups, but have then the opportunity to migrate to 
other groups, or create new ones. They observe a positive effect of voluntary participation on 
cooperation, in that contributions levels are above the theoretical prediction and closer to the 
socially efficient level. Hauk (2003) studies voluntary participation in repeated n-person 
prisoner’s dilemma games where players can choose between playing the game and securing an 
outside option payoff, and finds a positive effect on cooperation. My and Chalvignac (2010) 
compare a standard repeated public goods game with a game with two stages: in the first stage 
subjects decide whether or not to participate in the game; in the second stage subjects who 
decided to participate choose a contribution level, whereas subjects who opted out receive an 
outside option payoff. They find a weak but positive effect of the opt-out option on 
contributions.3 
                                           
2 Another, less closely related, literature entails the study of endogenous group formation in social dilemmas (e.g., 
Riedl and Ule, 2002; Cinyabuguma et al., 2005; Page et al., 2005; Ahn et al., 2008; 2009; Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010; 
Charness and Yang, 2014). The main focus of this literature, however, is on the effects of mechanisms, such as 
voting, partner-selection and ostracism that allow group members to regulate the participation of other individuals in 
their group. In contrast, the focus of our paper is on the decisions of the individual to self-select into or out of 
cooperative endeavors.  
3 Voluntary participation has also been studied in the context of team production games (e.g., Keser and 
Montmarquette, 2011). Also related are the experiments by Cason et al. (2002) and Cason et al. (2004), who study a 
two-stage, non-linear public goods game where, in the first stage, subjects can commit to free-ride by announcing 




A key difference between the studies mentioned above and our experiment is that previous 
studies typically entail repeated interactions between subjects, where the decisions to participate 
in a future round of interaction are made after having observed the outcome of previous 
interactions. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to identify the distinctive roles of 
mechanisms based on assortative matching or sanction threats in promoting cooperation, as the 
two types of mechanisms are confounded in those experimental designs. In contrast, our 
experiment is inspired by the theoretical arguments discussed above that emphasize the different 
effects that these mechanisms may have on cooperation. Thus, our experiment is based on one-
shot games where we can cleanly identify which mechanism drives the effects of voluntary 
participation on cooperation.  
In this sense, our paper is most closely related to the experiments by Orbell and Dawes 
(1993), who study non-repeated prisoner’s dilemma games with an unconditional participation 
option (subjects can decide whether to cooperate, defect, or not play the game), and Wilson and 
Wu (2017), who study infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games where players have an exit 
option to unilaterally and irrevocably terminate the relationship and secure an outside option 
payoff. However, Orbell and Dawes (1993) only focus on an assortative matching effect and 
Wilson and Wu (2017) only focus on sanctioning effects, whereas our experiment provides a 
unified framework where we can compare the relative effectiveness of either mechanism on 
cooperation. In line with our results, Wilson and Wu (2017) find that the presence of an exit 
option can substantially increase cooperation. Orbell and Dawes (1993) find that unconditional 
participation can also have a positive effect on cooperation and efficiency, which is in contrast to 
our finding. While the numerous differences between experimental designs make it difficult to 
precisely identify the source of this variation in experimental results, these discrepancies suggest 
that the specific details of the decision-making environment may play an important role in 
determining the effectiveness of participation. This may be an interesting issue for further 
research. 
The paper progresses as follows. Section 2 introduces the experimental design and 
procedures. Section 3 presents the results and discusses the main findings. Section 4 concludes. 
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2. EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
2.1 Experiment design 
Our experiment is based on a one-shot version of the following two-person public goods game 
(PGG). At the beginning of the game, subjects are randomly matched into two-person groups. In 
each group, subjects receive an endowment of 20 tokens each, and simultaneously decide 
whether to allocate these tokens to either a private or a group account. Each token a subject 
allocates to the private account earns 3 points to that subject, whereas each token allocated to the 
group account earns 2 points to each of the two subjects in the group (in the experiment point 
earnings were converted to cash at a rate of 0.15 GBP per point). Thus, the game contains a 
tension between private and collective interests: group payoffs are maximized when subjects 
allocate their whole endowment to the group account, resulting in a payoff of 80 points per 
subject. However, the optimal decision of a self-interested individual is to allocate all tokens to 
the private account, resulting in an equilibrium payoff of 60 points per subject. 
We study different versions of this game across three between-subject treatments, where 
we vary whether and how subjects can voluntarily participate in the PGG. In a Baseline treatment 
there is no option of voluntary participation and subjects are required to participate in the PGG. 
In contrast, in our Unconditional and Conditional treatments subjects choose whether or not to 
play the PGG. The two treatments differ in whether subjects can express their voluntary 
participation before or after having obtained information about their opponent’s contribution.  
The Unconditional treatment is based on a two-stage game where, in the first stage, 
subjects simultaneously decide whether to participate in the PGG or take an outside option 
payoff of 61 points, that is just above the Nash equilibrium payoff of the underlying PGG (see 
Section 2.2 for further discussion of the theoretical implications of this design choice). In the 
second stage, subjects learn their opponent’s participation decision. If both subjects have chosen 
to participate in the game, subjects play the one-shot PGG and are paid accordingly. If at least 
one subject in the group has chosen not to participate in the PGG, then both subjects receive the 
outside option payoff.4  
                                           
4 Note that in this sense the public good is not truly non-excludable in our setting, because a player’s choice not to 
take part in the game prevents both players from enjoying the benefits of public good provision. We made this 
choice for simplicity, to avoid the complications of having to specify the structure of payoffs in case only one player 
commits to provide the public good.  
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The Conditional treatment is also based on a two-stage game, but the option of voluntary 
participation is available in the second stage. In the first stage, subjects make a simultaneous 
contribution decision in the PGG. In the second stage, subjects learn their opponent’s 
contribution and simultaneously decide whether to confirm or withdraw their participation. If 
both subjects confirm their participation, subjects are paid according to the contribution decisions 
of stage one. If at least one subject withdraws participation, then both subjects receive the outside 
option payoff of 61 points.  
We use the Conditional treatment to study the effect of the threat-value of voluntary 
participation on cooperation. As we discussed in the previous section, the theoretical literature 
suggests that the freedom to reject a partnership has a positive effect of cooperation because it 
gives cooperators a means to discipline free-riders: given that a rejection imposes costs on both 
those who reject the partnership and their potential partners, cooperators can use it as threat to 
restrain opportunistic behavior and encourage cooperation. In our experiment we capture the 
essence of this mechanism by specifying a relatively low outside option payoff, which make non-
participation potentially costly. That is, if subjects decide to reject a partnership, this may lead to 
lower payoffs to both interacting parties, and thus players can use this as a threat to deter free-
riding.  
The Unconditional treatment allows us instead to study the effect of false consensus bias on 
cooperation. As discussed above, false consensus bias makes cooperators relatively more 
optimistic than free-riders about the prospects of interacting with a cooperator. If players are free 
to decide whether to participate in cooperative endeavors, false consensus bias may lead to a 
process of assortative matching whereby cooperators are more likely to self-select into the PGG 
than free-riders, with positive effects on cooperation.  
To study the false consensus mechanism in more detail, one needs to (i) classify whether 
subjects are “cooperators” or “free-riders”, and (ii) measure their relative optimism about the 
prevalence of cooperators in their session. To do this, in all treatments the PGG was preceded by 
a one-shot version of the sequential prisoner’s dilemma game (PD). At the beginning of the 
game, the first-mover chooses whether to cooperate or defect. If the first-mover defects the game 
ends and players receive a payoff of 50 points each. If the first-mover cooperates then the 
second-mover chooses between cooperation (where players receive 70 points each) and defection 
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(where first- and second-movers receive respectively 35 and 85 points).5 In the experiment, 
subjects were randomly matched in pairs and made decisions in both roles. Subjects did not learn 
which role they were actually assigned to until the end of the experiment. Thus, both choices 
were elicited in an incentive-compatible way. Moreover, subjects were asked to submit a 
prediction about the number of other participants in the session who would cooperate in the role 
of second-mover. This prediction was incentivized and subjects received 10 points if their guess 
was correct.6  
The PD game allows us to perform a more detailed test of the effect of false consensus bias 
on cooperation. First, based on their choices as second-mover, we can classify each subject as 
either a “cooperator” (if they cooperated) or “free-rider” (if they defected). Moreover, by 
eliciting subjects’ beliefs about others’ behavior in the role of second-mover, we can measure 
their estimate of the likelihood of meeting a cooperator, i.e. their “optimism” about cooperation. 
2.2 Theoretical considerations 
In the version of the PGG played in the Baseline treatment it is a dominant strategy for a rational 
and self-interested player to allocate all tokens to their private account. Thus, both players 
contribute zero tokens to the public good in the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, resulting in 
an equilibrium payoff of 60 points per subject. 
Assuming common knowledge of rationality and self-interest, the option of voluntary 
participation does not lead to higher predicted contributions in the Unconditional treatment. To 
see this, consider the second stage of the Unconditional game. In the subgame where subjects 
make a contribution decision in the PGG, the optimal decision of a rational and self-interested 
player is to contribute zero tokens, yielding an equilibrium payoff of 60 points per player. By 
replacing this subgame with its subgame perfect equilibrium value, we obtain the following 




                                           
5 Note that the structure of the game is similar to the binary trust game used by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). 
6 Since subjects were paid both for their choices in the PD game and their beliefs, a concern is that subjects may 
report distorted beliefs to hedge against their play in the game. Blanco et al. (2010), however, find no evidence of 
hedging in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game. 
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Table 1: Reduced Unconditional game  
 PLAYER 2 
PLAYER 1 Participate Do not participate 
Participate 60, 60 61, 61 
Do not participate 61, 61 61, 61 
The reduced game has multiple pure-strategy equilibria and in any equilibrium at least one 
subject refuses to take part in the PGG. Indeed, in the reduced game players have a weakly 
dominant strategy not to participate in the PGG and take the outside option payoff of 61 points, 
instead. Thus, if we refine the equilibrium set by requiring that players do not use weakly 
dominated strategies, only the equilibrium with mutual non-participation survives. Thus, the 
public good is not provided in equilibrium and each subject earns a payoff of 61 points. 
In contrast, in the Conditional treatment voluntary participation can lead to small, positive 
contributions in equilibrium. To see this, consider the subgames following the contribution stage. 
In any subgame, mutual non-participation is always an equilibrium, leading to a payoff of 61 for 
each player. However, other pure-strategy equilibria may also arise, some of which involve 
mutual participation, depending on the contributions made in the contribution stage. Specifically, 
there are three cases. First, in some subgames mutual participation would lead to payoffs that are 
strictly higher than 61 for both players. In these subgames, participating in the PGG is a weakly 
dominant strategy (within the subgame) for both players. Using weak dominance as a refinement, 
we select the equilibrium with mutual participation in these subgames. Second, in other 
subgames, mutual participation would lead to payoffs that are either equal to 61 for both players, 
or strictly lower than 61 for at least one player. In these subgames, any equilibrium involves a 
payoff of 61 for each player. Finally, in a third class of subgames, mutual participation would 
lead to a payoff of 61 for one player, and a payoff higher than 61 for the other player. In these 
subgames, participating in the PGG is a weakly dominant strategy (within the subgame) for the 
player who receives a payoff higher than 61 from participation, while the other player is 
indifferent between participation and non-participation. Thus there are three pure-strategy 
equilibria, one involving mutual participation and two involving non-participation by at least one 
player. In these subgames we select the equilibrium involving mutual participation on the 
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grounds that this equilibrium is strictly preferred by one player while the other player is 
indifferent between equilibria.7 
By replacing each subgame with its subgame perfect equilibrium value, we obtain a 
reduced game with five pure-strategy equilibria. Three equilibria involve symmetric 
contributions to the public good of respectively zero, one and two tokens. In the remaining two 
equilibria one player contributes zero tokens and the other player contributes one token. Note that 
in the two asymmetric equilibria and in the symmetric equilibrium with zero contributions at 
least one player earns a PGG payoff lower than 61. Thus, in the corresponding subgame perfect 
equilibria of the extended game players withdraw participation from the PGG and the public 
good is not provided. In the remaining two symmetric equilibria, both players earn at least 61 
points from the PGG and thus they confirm their participation in the PGG in the corresponding 
subgame perfect equilibria of the extended game.8  
No other pure-strategy equilibria exists. To see this, note first that there cannot be 
equilibria with contribution profiles where players contribute more than 2 tokens. Following such 
contribution profiles two possible situations arise. First, if players’ contributions are too different 
from each other, then participation leads to a payoff of 60 or lower for one player, thus triggering 
non-participation in the corresponding subgame and a payoff of 61 to both players. But then, at 
the contribution stage, players can deviate to contribution levels that lead to participation and 
thus increase payoffs. Second, if players’ contributions are not too different from each other, then 
participation leads to a payoff of at least 61 for both players and players confirm their 
participation in the PGG. But then the usual incentives to free-ride exist and at the contribution 
stage (at least) the player who contributes more has an incentive to deviate to a lower 
contribution (as long as it does not trigger non-participation). Finally, note that there cannot be 
equilibria where one player contributes 2 tokens and the other contributes 1 or 0 tokens: in this 
case players withdraw participation in the corresponding subgame, leading to a payoff of 61. But 
then, at the contribution stage, the player that contributes 1 or 0 tokens has an incentive to 
increase her contribution to 2 tokens, thus ensuring a payoff of 62.  
                                           
7 This has only minor implications for the set of subgame-perfect equilibria, as we discuss in the next footnote. 
8 If in the subgames where mutual participation leads to a payoff of 61 for one player and a payoff higher than 61 for 
the other player we select the equilibrium with non-participation, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria changes 
slightly as there is now a sixth equilibrium involving symmetric contributions of three tokens to the public good. 
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Overall this analysis shows that, according to standard predictions, voluntary participation 
has only a small positive effect on public good provision. Moreover, this positive effect obtains 
only when voluntary participation can be conditioned on the opponent’s contribution decision. 
These predictions may change if we relax the assumption that all individuals are self-
interested and assume that at least some individuals have other-regarding preferences. In this case, 
positive contributions may emerge in equilibrium already in the Baseline treatment. To illustrate 
this point, assume that players have Fehr-Schmidt (1999) preferences so that player i's utility is 
given by: 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖[𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜋𝑗 − 𝜋𝑖 , 0}] − 𝛽𝑖[𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜋𝑖 − 𝜋𝑗 , 0}] 
for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, and where 𝜋𝑖 is the player's material payoff from the game, the parameter 𝛼𝑖 measures 
her aversion to disadvantageous payoff inequality, and the parameter 𝛽𝑖 measures her aversion to 
advantageous payoff inequality. Fehr and Schmidt assume that 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝑖 < 1. As we 
show in the online appendix, if players have a sufficiently strong distaste for advantageous 
inequality (𝛽𝑖 > 1/3), then any symmetric contribution profile is an equilibrium already in the 
Baseline treatment.  
In the presence of other-regarding players, positive contributions and provision of the 
public good can also occur when there is an unconditional participation option. To see this, 
consider first the case where players know each other’s preferences. In the online appendix we 
show that if two sufficiently inequity averse players (𝛽𝑖 > 1/3) are matched together in the 
Unconditional treatment, then the only equilibrium in undominated strategies involves 
participation and symmetric positive contributions. However, if either player is not sufficiently 
inequity averse (𝛽𝑖 < 1/3), then the equilibrium involves non-participation and the public good 
is not provided. Thus, when players know each other’s preferences, the prediction is that 
(sufficiently) other-regarding players participate and provide the public good, while players who 
are not other-regarding do not participate. 
A similar mechanism of assortative matching may also take place if players do not know 
each other’s preferences, but suffer from a false consensus bias. If players do not know the 
preferences of their opponent, they will base their decision of whether to participate in the PGG 
on their expectations about the proportions of other-regarding and self-interested players in the 
population. If players suffer from a false consensus bias, then other-regarding players are more 
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optimistic than self-interested players about the chances of meeting another other-regarding 
player. Therefore, they may be more likely to sort themselves into the PGG than self-interested 
players, triggering a process of assortative matching that also leads to public good provision.9 
Finally, the presence of other-regarding players may also strengthen the positive effects of 
conditional participation on contributions. In the online appendix we show that if players have a 
sufficiently strong distaste for disadvantageous inequity (𝛼𝑖 > 5.67), then any symmetric 
positive contribution profile can be sustained in equilibrium, including the profile with full 
contributions.10 This is because players with other-regarding preferences may be willing to 
withdraw participation from the PGG even if this implies a sacrifice in their own material 
payoffs. Thus, threats that are not credible for self-interested players may become credible if 
players have other-regarding preferences, and this may further discipline free-riders.11 
2.3 Experiment procedures 
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the University 
of Nottingham using students from a wide range of disciplines recruited through the online 
recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). We conducted fourteen sessions: four sessions with 
a total of 68 subjects in each of Baseline and Conditional, and six sessions with a total of 92 
subjects in Unconditional. We over recruited in the Unconditional treatment to account for 
potential attrition of subjects out of the PGG and we kept recruiting subjects until we obtained 
contribution decisions from 68 subjects in this treatment as well. 
At the start of a session, subjects were randomly allocated to computer terminals and were 
given preliminary experimental instructions, which were read aloud (instructions are available in 
the online appendix). Subjects were informed that the experiment consisted of two parts, but they 
did not receive instructions for part two (the PGG) until everyone had completed part one (the 
PD game). Subjects were then given part-one instructions, which were again read aloud. These 
                                           
9 See Orbell and Dawes (1991) for a model of selective cooperation when players suffer from false consensus bias. 
10 This level of disadvantageous inequity aversion is high. Blanco et al. (2011), for instance, find that only 13% of 
subjects in their experiment have 𝛼𝑖 ≥ 4.5. However, even for smaller levels of 𝛼𝑖, one can sustain positive 
contribution profiles in equilibrium where both players contribute more than 2 tokens (the highest contribution 
profile that can be sustained with self-interested players). See the online appendix for details. 
11 This is akin to rejection of low offers in ultimatum games (which the Conditional treatment indeed resembles). 
There, the average rejection rate is about 16 percent (Oosterbeek et al., 2004), with low offers being rejected more 
readily (about half of the time, see Camerer, 2003) than higher offers.  
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instructions were followed by a series of control questions aimed at testing subjects’ 
understanding of the PD game. Part one began once all subjects had answered all questions 
correctly. Subjects were then randomly matched in pairs and played the one-shot PD game 
described above. 
When everyone had completed part one, and without receiving feedback on the outcomes 
of the PD game, subjects were given part-two instructions, which were read aloud. Again, the 
instructions were followed by control questions to probe subjects’ understanding of the game. 
Part two began when everyone had answered all questions correctly. Subjects were then 
randomly matched into new pairs and played one of the three versions of the PGG described 
above. 
At the end of part two, subjects were informed of their earnings from the two parts of the 
experiment. For part one, in each pair one of the subjects was randomly assigned the role of first-
mover and the other subject the role of second-mover. One of the two parts was then randomly 
selected for payment, and subjects were paid accordingly in private and in cash while they were 
completing a short post-experimental questionnaire, where we elicited standard socio-
demographic and attitudinal information. The questionnaire included a self-assessment of 
subjects’ risk and trust attitudes. Risk attitudes were elicited using the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (SOEP) general risk question discussed in Dohmen et al. (2011), and trust attitudes were 
elicited using the World Values Survey (WVS) Trust question.12 Sessions lasted approximately 
60 minutes and earnings averaged GBP 9.13. 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Contribution behavior across treatments 
Figure 1 summarizes the main result of the experiment. The left panel of the figure shows the 
average contributions to the public good as percentage of endowment in our three treatments. In 
                                           
12 The SOEP question reads: “Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid 
taking risks?”, and subjects answered on a Likert scale ranging from 0 (“risk averse”) to 10 (“fully prepared to take 
risk”). The average response to the SOEP risk question was 5.64 (s.d. 2.12). The WVS Trust question reads: 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing 
with people?”, to which subjects replied either by saying that they believe that “most people can be trusted” or that 
one needs “to be very careful in dealing with people”. Responses to the WVS Trust question reveal that about 41% 
of our subjects believe that “most people can be trusted”. 
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the right panel of the figure we plot, for each treatment, the cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) of contributions as percentage of the subjects’ initial endowment. 
Figure 1: Contributions to public good across treatments 
  
On average in Baseline subjects contribute about 22% of their endowment to the public 
good. The right panel of Figure 1 shows that a substantial fraction of subjects (43%) act as 
complete free-riders and make no contributions to the public good. Only 10% of subjects 
contribute at least half of their endowment, and only 6% contribute the entire endowment. The 
average contribution rate in Baseline is similar to those reported in the one-shot public goods 
game experiments by Cubitt et al. (2011), Dufwenberg et al. (2011) and Fischbacher et al. 
(2012), who also find average contributions in the 20%-30% range. Other one-shot experiments 
report average contributions in the 35%-45% range (Gächter et al., 2004; Gächter and Herrmann, 
2009), while Walker and Halloran (2004) find an average contribution rate of 53%. Overall, 
these results show that the prospects for cooperation among strangers can be dismal in the 
absence of mechanisms that can discipline free-riding. The question is whether voluntary 
participation can be used as such a mechanism to improve cooperation.  
Figure 1 suggests that the answer is positive, although the effectiveness of voluntary 
participation crucially depends on whether the participation decision can be conditioned on the 
opponent’s contributions. In particular, the Conditional treatment produces a more than two-fold 
increase in contributions relative to Baseline: subjects contribute on average 47% of their 
endowment. Note that this statistic is computed using subjects’ first stage contribution decisions, 





































































any potential effects of selection (e.g., if the high-contributing groups may be more likely to 
agree to play the PGG). In the analysis of section 3.4 we will explore selection effects in more 
detail. 
Inspection of the right panel of Figure 1 reveals that conditional participation has a 
dramatic impact on the distribution of contributions: the percentage of free-riders drops to 25%; 
40% of subjects contribute at least half of their endowment; and 24% contribute their full 
endowment to the public good. We use Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests to 
formally compare contributions between the Conditional and Baseline treatments. In both cases 
the treatment differences are highly significant (MW: z = 3.475, p = 0.001, two-tailed; KS: D = 
0.309, p = 0.003, two-tailed; n = 68 per treatment). 
In contrast, voluntary participation has only a negligible impact on cooperation when the 
participation decision is unconditional. Average contributions in the Unconditional treatment are 
22% of endowment, exactly as in Baseline. The right panel of Figure 1 reveals that unconditional 
participation has two contrasting effects on contribution behavior. On the one hand, it somewhat 
increases the share of high contributions relative to Baseline (15% of subjects in Unconditional 
contribute at least half of their endowment). On the other hand, it seems to encourage free-riding: 
in Unconditional half of subjects contribute zero tokens to the public good. However, these 
effects are small. In fact, we cannot detect statistically significant differences between 
Unconditional and Baseline using Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (MW: z = 
0.641, p = 0.522, two-tailed; KS: D = 0.088, p = 0.954, two-tailed; n = 68 per treatment). 
Contributions are instead significantly different between Unconditional and Conditional, both 
using Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (MW: z = 3.800, p < 0.001, two-tailed; KS: 
D = 0.309, p = 0.003, two-tailed; n = 68 per treatment). 
3.2 A robustness treatment: Unconditional_High 
Overall, our results suggest that voluntary participation can promote cooperation and have a 
positive effect on public good provision. However, this positive effect is observed only when 
participation can be conditioned on the opponent’s contribution decision. Unconditional 
participation does not seem to have bite in our setting as cooperation levels when voluntary 
participation is available are very similar to the case of forced participation. 
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A potential reason why unconditional participation performs poorly in our setting is that 
the value we chose for the outside option payoff is too low to trigger a mechanism of assortative 
matching based on beliefs of cooperation. That is, when the value of the outside option payoff is 
low, even a pessimistic free-rider, who attaches a low probability to the event of meeting a 
cooperator, may find it profitable to self-select into cooperative groups. In fact, prima facie our 
data seem to support this conjecture. We observe very little selection in the Unconditional 
treatment as 86% of our subjects chose to take part in the PGG. Moreover, as noted in the 
previous sub-section, unconditional participation seems to increase the fraction of both high 
contributors and free-riders. 
To address this issue, we conducted an additional treatment with unconditional 
participation, Unconditional_High. This treatment is identical to the original Unconditional 
treatment except that the outside option payoff was set at 70 points, halfway between the Nash 
equilibrium payoff level and the joint-payoff maximizing level. We recruited an additional 154 
subjects for the Unconditional_High treatment across eight sessions, using the same subject pool, 
recruitment and procedures as in the other treatments. We observe substantial selection in 
Unconditional_High: only 50% of the subjects decided to take part in the PGG, whereas the 
remaining subjects chose to secure the outside option payoff. Overall, in fifty-eight of the 
seventy-seven groups at least one subject did not take part in the PGG. Hence, in 
Unconditional_High we observe contribution decisions from 38 subjects in total. 
Figure 2 shows the average contribution level and the CDF of contributions in 
Unconditional_High. For ease of comparison, the figure also reproduces the average contribution 
levels and CDFs of the other three treatments, which were already shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 2: Contributions to public good in Unconditional_High 
  
The substantially higher value of the outside option payoff does not improve the 
effectiveness of unconditional participation. As in Baseline and Unconditional, also in 
Unconditional_High subjects contribute on average about 22% of the endowment. Moreover, the 
right panel of Figure 2 shows that the distribution of contributions in Unconditional_High 
overlap substantially with those of Baseline and Unconditional. The figure also reinforces the 
impression that unconditional participation has two contrasting effects on contributions as it 
seems to encourage both more free-riding and more cooperation relative to Baseline. The fraction 
of full free-riders in Unconditional_High is 53%. At the same time, 16% of subjects contribute at 
least half of their endowment to the public good, with 11% contributing the whole endowment. 
Overall, using Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, we do not find any significant 
differences between Unconditional_High and Baseline (MW: z = 0.876, p = 0.381, two-tailed; 
KS: D = 0.176, p = 0.439, two-tailed; n = 68 in Baseline, n = 38 in Unconditional_High), or 
between Unconditional_High and Unconditional (MW: z = 0.283, p = 0.777, two-tailed; KS: D = 
0.117, p = 0.893, two-tailed; n = 68 in Unconditional, n = 38 in Unconditional_High 
Unconditional_High). Contributions are instead significantly different between 
Unconditional_High and Conditional (MW: z = 3.259, p = 0.001, two-tailed; KS: D = 0.352, p = 
0.005, two-tailed; n = 68 in Conditional, n = 38 in Unconditional_High). 
Overall, these data point to the limits of a mechanism of assortative matching based on 
different beliefs of cooperation between cooperators and free-riders. In our original 
Unconditional treatment we observe a negligible effect of voluntary participation on cooperation, 






































































selection in the Unconditional_High treatment. Yet, we again find no effect of voluntary 
participation on cooperation. In the next sub-section we look further into the reasons for the 
failure of unconditional participation as well as the reasons for the success of the conditional 
mechanism. 
3.3 The determinants of conditional and unconditional participation 
As argued above, a possible instance in which unconditional participation may affect cooperation 
through an assortative matching mechanism hinges on individuals suffering from a false 
consensus bias whereby cooperators are more optimistic than free-riders about the likelihood of 
meeting another cooperator. If this bias is sufficiently strong, and if subjects act on these biased 
beliefs when they decide whether to participate in the PGG, cooperators will be more likely than 
free-riders to self-select into the PGG. Within this framework, the limited effects of 
unconditional participation on cooperation may be explained by two different reasons. First, 
subjects in our experiment may not suffer from a false consensus bias. Alternatively, they could 
display a false consensus bias, but they may fail to act on their biased beliefs when deciding to 
enter the PGG. 
Our data from the PD game allows us to explore these alternative explanations. We use 
choices in the role of second-mover in the PD game to classify subjects as “cooperators” (if they 
cooperated) or “free-riders” (if they defected). Across our four treatments, we classify 42% of 
our subjects as cooperators and 58% as free-riders.13 We use subjects’ beliefs about others’ 
behavior in the role of second-mover in the PD game to measure their optimism about the 
likelihood of interacting with a cooperator. On average, cooperators believe that 48% of the other 
subjects are also cooperators. In contrast, free-riders believe that only 31% of others are 
cooperators. This difference in beliefs is significant at the 1% level using a Mann-Whitney test (z 
= 5.893, p < 0.001, two-tailed; cooperators n = 160, free-riders n = 222).14 Thus, in line with the 
existing experimental evidence, our subjects display a false consensus bias. 
                                           
13 The classification of types in the PD game correlates well with contribution behavior in the PGG. A regression of 
subjects’ contributions in the PGG on PD type and treatment dummies shows that cooperators contribute about 14% 
more than free-riders and the difference in significant at the 1% level.  
14 This result holds also if we focus on the Unconditional and Unconditional_High treatments only. Here, 
cooperators and free-riders believe that, respectively, 47% and 31% of the others are cooperators, and the difference 
is significant at the 1% level using a Mann-Whitney test (z = 4.321, p < 0.001, two-tailed; cooperators n = 94, free-
riders n = 152). 
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We next use regression analysis to examine whether this bias in subjects’ optimism about 
the prospects of meeting a cooperator affects their decision to participate in the PGG. Table 2 
reports marginal effects from logit regressions of participation decisions of subjects in the 
Unconditional and Unconditional_High treatments. In all models the dependent variable assumes 
value 1 if a subject chooses to participate in the PGG, and 0 otherwise. In model I we use as 
regressor a dummy variable assuming value 1 if a subject is classified as a cooperator in the PD 
game, and 0 otherwise. In model II we use instead our measurement of subjects’ optimism, 
defined as a subject’s estimate of the fraction of other participants in the session that act as 
cooperators in the PD game (on a scale from 0 to 1). Note that the implicit assumption here is 
that a subject’s beliefs about cooperation in the PD game are correlated with their beliefs about 
behavior in the PGG, which we did not elicit. In model III we include both the cooperator 
dummy and the optimism variable. In all models we also include a gender dummy (1 if subject is 
male), a dummy assuming value 1 if the subject studies Economics and 0 otherwise, and 
measurements of subjects’ self-assessment of their risk attitudes (the SOEP general risk question) 
and trust attitudes (the WVS Trust question).15 
The regressions show that there is little evidence in our data of sorting based on 
cooperativeness or beliefs of cooperativeness. Subjects’ cooperativeness, as captured by the 
cooperator dummy, has virtually no impact on the decision to participate in the PGG (model I). 
Subjects’ degree of optimism has somewhat more success in explaining participation decisions, 
as shown in model II: an increase in optimism by 10 percentage points increase the likelihood to 
enter the PGG by about 2%, and the effect is insignificant (p = 0.152). In model III we include 
both cooperativeness and optimism as explanatory variables, but neither reaches statistical 
significance at the 10% level. In fact, the cooperator dummy enters with a negative sign in the 
regression, indicating that, controlling for their degree of optimism, cooperators are actually less 
likely to enter the PGG than free-riders.16 None of the other regressors are statistically significant 
in any of the models except the measurement of risk attitudes, which is positively related to the 
decision to participate. 
                                           
15 Note, however, that the variables measuring risk and trust attitudes may not be entirely exogenous since they may 
to some extent reflect subjects’ ex-post rationalizations of their behavior in the experiment (e.g., a subject who has 
self-selected into the PGG may be more likely to perceive him/herself as risk loving in the questionnaire). 
16 We also ran an additional regression where we interacted the cooperator dummy with the optimism variable. The 
interaction term and the cooperator and optimism variables are all statistically insignificant in this regression.  
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Table 2: Logit regressions of participation decisions – Unconditional treatments 
 I II III 
Cooperator in PD game 0.003 -- -0.024 
 (0.066) -- (0.069) 
Optimism in PD game -- 0.167 0.179 
 -- (0.117) (0.121) 
1 if male 0.037 0.029 0.027 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) 
1 if studies Economics 0.039 0.060 0.059 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) 
SOEP risk loving 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
WVS high trust 0.047 0.036 0.036 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) 
N 246 246 246 
Note: Marginal effects of logit regressions, standard errors in parentheses. In all models the 
dependent variable assumes value 1 if a subject chose to participate in the PGG and 0 
otherwise. Significance levels: *** 1%.  
Overall, this analysis shows that, while our subjects do display a false consensus bias, they 
seem not to act on their biased beliefs about others’ cooperativeness when deciding to participate 
in the PGG. This explains the limited effectiveness of unconditional participation in our 
experiment. 
We next turn to subjects’ participation decisions in the Conditional treatment. First, we 
note that the decision to withdraw participation is made quite frequently in our experiment. In 
76% of groups at least one subject decided to withdraw their participation from the PGG. This 
decision is predominantly taken when subjects contribute more than their opponent: when this 
happens, subjects choose to withdraw participation in 80% of cases. On the contrary, subjects 
confirm their participation in the PGG in 90% of cases where their contributions are the same or 
lower than that of their opponent. This suggests that withdrawal decisions are mainly used to 
retaliate against free-riding. In most of cases withdrawals are also materially beneficial for the 
subject who makes that decision because the payoff of withdrawing participation exceeds that of 
participating in the PGG. However, we also have 7 cases where the payoff of non-participation is 
lower than that of participation, and in 2 of these (29%) the subject decided not to participate. 
We analyze these patterns of withdrawal decisions more formally in Table 3, where we 
report marginal effects of a logit regression of participation decisions in the Conditional 
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treatment. The dependent variable assumes value 1 if a subject chose to participate in the PGG, 
and 0 otherwise. We use three specifications. In model I we include a variable measuring the 
amount contributed by the other subject in the group. In model II we add a subject’s own 
contribution as a regressor. Finally, in model III we use a variable measuring the difference 
between subject i’s contribution and the contribution of the other subject j. All models also 
include the cooperator dummy and the control variables used in Table 2. 
Table 3: Logit regressions of participation decisions – Conditional treatment 
 I II III 














Cooperator in PD game 0.020 0.091 0.104 
 (0.147) (0.103) (0.148) 
1 if male 0.125 0.034 0.086 
 (0.164) (0.120) (0.154) 
1 if studies Economics 0.074 0.098 0.242 
 (0.161) (0.088) (0.171) 
SOEP risk loving -0.067* -0.036 -0.064 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.041) 
WVS high trust 0.116 0.034 -0.052 
 (0.161) (0.111) (0.173) 
N 68 68 68 
Note: Marginal effects of logit regressions, robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for intragroup correlation 
(PGG groups are used as independent clustering units). The dependent variable assumes value 1 if subject i chose to 
participate in the PGG and 0 otherwise. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.  
The regressions confirm that participation is strongly influenced by subjects’ decisions in 
the contribution stage. Model I and II show that the likelihood of participating in the PGG is 
positively related to the other subject’s contribution and negatively related to the subject’s own 
contribution.17 Model III shows that this polarized impact of other’s and own contributions on 
participation can be described as an effect of the differences in contributions: a one-token 
difference between contributions of the two players decreases the likelihood of participation by 
                                           
17 This effect is robust to alternative specifications, e.g. if we drop the PD cooperator dummy (since it is correlated 
with own contributions in the PGG). 
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about 7%. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. Subjects’ cooperativeness does 
not explain the decision to participate in the PGG. None of the other explanatory variables have a 
systematic effect on participation decisions. 
3.4 Earnings across treatments 
We conclude this section with an analysis of earnings across treatments. In Baseline subjects on 
average earn 64.49 points, somewhat more than the Nash equilibrium outcome of 60 points, but 
substantially less than the joint-payoff maximizing level of 80 points. Computing efficiency as 
attained earnings in excess of the zero-contribution Nash equilibrium earnings as a percentage of 
maximum possible gains, we find that in Baseline this is equal to 
(64.49−60)
(80−60)
= 22.5%. If we 
consider earnings conditional on both subjects in the group agreeing to participate in the game, 
we find that conditional participation has a substantial beneficial effect compared to Baseline. 
The average earnings of the subjects who agreed to play the PGG in the Conditional treatment 
are 76.38 points (an efficiency of 81.9%), and earnings in this treatment are significantly 
different from Baseline (Mann-Whitney test: z = 4.032, p < 0.001, two-tailed; n = 34 in Baseline, 
n = 8 in Conditional).18 Thus, conditional participation leads to a gain in efficiency of 81.9% - 
22.5% = 59.4% relative to Baseline. This efficiency gain reflects both a potential selection effect 
(the high-contributing groups may be more likely to agree to play the PGG) and the effect of the 
threat-value of voluntary participation. To disentangle the two, we also compute average earnings 
of all subjects based on their contributions in the PGG, regardless of their participation decisions, 
thus removing selection effects. We find that average earnings are 69.32 points (an efficiency of 
46.6%), and earnings are significantly different from Baseline (Mann-Whitney test: z = 3.479, p 
< 0.001, two-tailed; n = 34 per treatment). This suggests that the threat-value of voluntary 
participation alone accounts for 46.6% - 22.5% = 24.1% out of the 59.4% efficiency gain of 
Conditional relative to Baseline. 
In the treatments with unconditional participation, average earnings (conditional on 
participation) are instead 64.34, both in Unconditional and Unconditional_High (an efficiency of 
21.7%). In both cases, earnings are not significantly different from Baseline (Mann-Whitney 
                                           
18 Note that tests on earnings are conducted at the pair level rather than at the subject level because subjects’ earnings 
within a pair are not independent from each other. 
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tests: Baseline vs. Unconditional, z = 0.179, p = 0.858, two-tailed, n = 34 per treatment; Baseline 
vs. Unconditional_High, z = 0.252, p = 0.801, two-tailed, n = 34 in Baseline, n = 19 in 
Unconditional_High). These results confirm the relative advantage of conditional versus 
unconditional participation in our setting. 
Of course, voluntary (non-)participation can imply substantial costs if subjects choose to 
forgo positive levels of public good provision and prefer to secure the outside option payoff 
instead. To examine this, we also compute realized earnings in the Conditional and 
Unconditional treatments as equal to subjects’ PGG earnings if both subjects in the group agreed 
to participate in the game, and to the outside option payoff otherwise.19 Average realized 
earnings in the Conditional treatment are 64.62 points (an efficiency of 23.1%), and we do not 
find significantly differences relative to Baseline (Mann-Whitney test: z = 0.556, p = 0.578, two-
tailed; n = 34 per treatment). Thus, the frequent decisions to withdraw participation reduce the 
positive effects of voluntary participation. Average realized earnings in Unconditional are equal 
to 63.47 points (an efficiency of 17.4%). Again, we do not detect significant differences in 
earnings relative to Baseline (Mann-Whitney test: z = 0.908, p = 0.364, two-tailed; n = 34 in 
Baseline, n = 46 in Unconditional). 
This latter set of results should be taken with caution as they are inevitably sensitive to the 
details of our experimental implementation, such as the specific value of the outside option 
payoff, or the fact that we implemented a one-shot version of the PGG rather than a repeated 
version of the game.20 In practice (as well as in the theoretical models discussed in the 
Introduction) the value of participation is partly determined endogenously, and may depend, 
among other things, on the expected time horizon of the interaction and individuals’ discount 
factor, and all this may affect the efficiency consequences of the conditional mechanism. 
Nevertheless, our findings point to a potential limitation of this mechanism. Subjects frequently 
withdraw participation when this option is available even when doing so reduces joint payoffs 
(this actually occurs in 75% of cases). As a consequence, when one accounts for the costs of 
                                           
19 In doing this we only focus on our three original treatments and we do not include Unconditional_High in the 
analysis. The artificially high value of the outside option payoff in this treatment implies that not participating in the 
PGG is unlikely to lead to efficiency losses.  
20 There is evidence that retaliation mechanisms that are socially inefficient in the short-run may nonetheless lead to 
long-run benefits (e.g., Gächter et al., 2008). 
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withdrawals, realized earnings are not significantly different between settings with forced and 
voluntary participation. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Our study has shed light on the effects of voluntary participation on cooperation. In a one-shot 
two-person public goods game, we have found that allowing players to voluntarily take part in 
the game can have a beneficial effect on contributions relative to a setting where participation is 
forced. However, our study also shows that voluntary participation is most effective when 
subjects are let free to reject (potential) partnerships they are not satisfied with. This allows 
cooperators to shield themselves from exploitation by free-riders, as the threat of costly rejections 
is powerful in disciplining free-riding and fostering higher contributions. 
By contrast, voluntary participation does not foster cooperation when it operates through a 
mechanism of assortative matching driven by false consensus bias: if cooperators are more 
optimistic than free-riders about the prospects of meeting other cooperators, then voluntary 
participation may facilitate a process of self-selection whereby cooperators participate into the 
public goods game and free-riders stay out. In the experiment we do find evidence of a false 
consensus bias, but we also find that subjects do not seem to act upon their biased beliefs when 
they decide whether to participate in the public goods game. Thus the participation decisions of 
cooperators and free-riders are not statistically distinguishable from each other. As a 
consequence, this mechanism is not successful in fostering public good provision. 
While the specific assortative matching mechanism based on false consensus bias that we 
have studied here does not seem to be successful in fostering cooperation, this is not the only 
mechanism through which voluntary participation may trigger assortative matching, and 
alternative mechanisms may be more successful in fostering cooperation. For instance, Aimone 
et al. (2013) study a modified public goods game where groups are formed based on subjects’ 
willingness to sacrifice returns from private investments. They find that cooperators are more 
willing to sacrifice private investments than free-riders, which leads to assortative matching and 
increased public good provision. 
Moreover, in natural environments individuals may rely on communication and other 
observable characteristics about their potential interaction partners to predict their cooperative 
inclination and hence decide whether or not to start a partnerships with them. Some authors have 
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argued that this may also lead to assortative matching of cooperative types (e.g., Frank, 1987; 
1988; Amann and Yang, 1998). However, the empirical evidence suggests that individuals are 
only to some extent able to predict whether others are likely to cooperate. Belot et al. (2012), for 
example, ask subjects in an experiment to watch clips of a prisoner’s dilemma game played on a 
TV show, and then predict the extent to which TV show contestants are likely to cooperate. 
While subjects estimate a higher likelihood of cooperation for cooperators than free-riders, the 
difference is small (7 percentage points). In line with this, van den Assem et al. (2011) find that 
contestants in a related TV show do not predict well the cooperative behavior of their opponents.  
Though the two mechanisms studied in our paper cannot be applied to non-excludible 
public goods such as clean air or national security, there are several naturally occurring settings 
in which goods are publicly provided only to members who voluntarily participate in such 
cooperative endeavors. Typical real-world examples are associations, clubs, workplaces, 
partnerships, and the like, in which individuals may have the freedom to join in, or opt out from, 
participating in the provision of (local) public goods.21 
In those and similar instances, cooperation among individuals is crucial while it is often 
characterized by intrinsic fragility due to the conflict between individual incentives and social 
optimal actions. Despite its fragility, in naturally occurring environments, a large variety of 
mechanisms are at work to foster cooperative outcomes. Scholars have explored a significant 
number of mechanisms conducive to cooperation. Our study has focused on a fundamental 
mechanism, voluntary participation, in the attempt to uncover useful stylized patterns for the 
design of institutions aimed at overcoming under-provision of public goods. The development of 
such institutions is an intellectual journey that will require the understanding of “how diverse 
polycentric institutions help or hinder the (…) levels of cooperation of participants, and the 
achievement of more effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales” (Ostrom, 
2010, p. 665); such a journey seems far from reaching its end.  
                                           
21 However, note that in our two-player experiment withdrawal of participation by one player effectively means the 
automatic exclusion of the other. It may be interesting to extend our design in order to adapt the two mechanisms of 
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ONLINE SUPPLEMENT TO  
“THE EFFECT OF VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION ON COOPERATION”  
BY DANIELE NOSENZO AND FABIO TUFANO 
In Appendix A we present predictions for the Baseline, Unconditional and Conditional treatment 
for the model of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
In Appendix B we present the instructions used in the experiments. The preliminary instructions 
and instructions for Part 1 were common to all treatments. The instructions for Part 2 differed 




APPENDIX A: INEQUALITY AVERSION AND EQUILIBRIUM CONTRIBUTIONS 
Suppose players have Fehr-Schmidt preferences as defined in the main text. In Baseline, material payoffs are given 
by:  
𝜋𝑖 = 20 −  𝑐𝑖 +
2
3
⋅ ( 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑐𝑗) 
where 𝑐𝑖  {0, 1, …, 20} denotes player 𝑖's contribution.  
Suppose each player contributes c tokens to the public good. Then player i gets an utility of 𝑈𝑖 = 20 − 𝑐 +
4
3




If player i were to unilaterally increase her contribution her material payoff would fall, she would incur 
disutility from disadvantageous inequality vis-à-vis the other player. Thus it is not possible for player i to increase 
her utility by increasing contributions beyond c.  






𝑡 − 𝑡𝛽𝑖. Thus the reduction in contribution changes utility by ∆𝑈𝑖 = 𝑡 −
2
3
𝑡 − 𝑡𝛽𝑖 = 𝑡(
1
3
− 𝛽𝑖). This is 




. Thus if 
the two players have 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 𝛽𝑖
∗ any symmetric contribution profile is an equilibrium. 
 
Consider now the Unconditional treatment. Suppose that both players have 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 𝛽𝑖
∗ and that they know each other’s 
preferences. As shown above, in the subgame where subjects make a contribution decision in the PGG, any 
symmetric contribution profile is an equilibrium. Suppose that players select an equilibrium with positive 
contributions, yielding an equilibrium payoff ?̂?𝑖 strictly greater than 61 points per player.
1 By replacing this subgame 
with its subgame perfect equilibrium value, we obtain the following reduced game. 
Table A1: Reduced Unconditional game - 𝜷𝒊 ≥ 𝜷𝒊
∗ 
 PLAYER 2 
PLAYER 1 Participate Do not participate 
Participate ?̂?1, ?̂?2 61, 61 
Do not participate 61, 61 61, 61 
The reduced game has two pure-strategy equilibria, one involving mutual non-participation and one 
involving mutual participation. Moreover, participation is a weakly dominant strategy. Thus, if we refine the 
equilibrium set by requiring that players do not use weakly dominated strategies, only the equilibrium with mutual 
participation survives. This shows that unconditional participation can have a positive effect on contributions with 
other-regarding players.  
                                           
1 This requires 𝑐 > 1. 
2 
 
However, if one or both players have 𝛽𝑖 < 𝛽𝑖
∗, then unconditional participation has no positive effect on 
contributions. To see this, note that in the subgame where subjects make a contribution decision in the PGG, the only 
equilibrium now involves zero contributions and a payoff of 60 points per player. Thus, the corresponding reduced 
game is:  
Table A2: Reduced Unconditional game – at least one player 𝜷𝒊 < 𝜷𝒊
∗ 
 PLAYER 2 
PLAYER 1 Participate Do not participate 
Participate 60, 60 61, 61 
Do not participate 61, 61 61, 61 
As discussed in the main text, here the only equilibrium where players do not use weakly dominated 
strategies is the one involving mutual non-participation. 
 
Finally, consider the Conditional treatment. Suppose that both players are sufficiently averse to disadvantageous 
inequality and have 𝛼𝑖 ≥ 𝛼𝑖
∗ = 5.67. For this level of aversion to disadvantageous inequality, player i prefers non-
participation and an outside payoff of 61 to participating in any game with contribution profiles where i's own 
contribution is one token higher than j’s contribution. 2 
Given this, the logic to construct the equilibria is similar to that presented in the main text for self-interested 
players. Consider the subgames following the contribution stage. There are three cases. First, in all subgames 
following asymmetric contribution profiles, any equilibrium involves non-participation and a payoff of 61 for each 
player because inequality-averse players have a weakly dominant strategy (within the subgame) not to participate. 
Second, in the subgames where players’ contributions are symmetric and larger than 1, participating in the PGG is a 
weakly dominant strategy (within the subgame) for both players. Using weak dominance as a refinement, we select 
the equilibrium with mutual participation in these subgames. Finally, in the subgames where players’ contributions 
are 0 or 1, mutual participation would lead to payoffs of 60 or 61 per player, respectively. In these subgames, any 
equilibrium involves a payoff of 61 per player (respectively because non-participation is weakly dominant, or 
because both participation and non-participation lead to a payoff of 61).  
By replacing each subgame with its subgame perfect equilibrium value, we obtain a reduced game where any 
symmetric contribution profile is an equilibrium. In the symmetric equilibrium with zero contributions both players 
earn a PGG payoff lower than 61. Thus, in the corresponding subgame perfect equilibria of the extended game 
players withdraw participation from the PGG and the public good is not provided. In the remaining equilibria, both 
players earn at least 61 points from the PGG and thus they confirm their participation in the PGG in the 
                                           
2 When 𝛼𝑖 = 5.67, player i prefers not to participate even when player i contributes 20 and player j contributes 19. 
Confirming participation would lead to a payoff of 78 for player i and a payoff of 81 to player j. The utility of player 
i from participation is thus: 78 − 5.67(81 − 78) = 60.99 and, thus, player i prefers to withdraw participation. 
3 
 
corresponding subgame perfect equilibria of the extended game. Thus, relative to the case of self-interested 
preferences, higher contribution levels can be sustained in equilibrium when players are sufficiently averse to 
disadvantageous inequality.  
Which contribution levels can actually be sustained in equilibrium depends on the degree of aversion to 
disadvantageous inequality. When 𝛼𝑖 ≥ 𝛼𝑖
∗ = 5.67, as we have assumed above, any symmetric contribution profile, 
including the one with full contributions, can be sustained in equilibrium. However, this level of aversion to 
disadvantageous inequality may be very high (Blanco et al., 2011, find that only 13% of subjects have an 𝛼𝑖 ≥ 4.5). 
Even for smaller level of aversion to disadvantageous inequality, one can sustain contribution profiles where players 
contribute more than 2 tokens (the profile that can sustained with self-interested preferences). For example, when 
𝛼𝑖 ≥ 1 contributions up to 6 tokens per player can be sustained in equilibrium since a player i with 𝛼𝑖 ≥ 1 would 
prefer non-participation with an outside payoff of 61 to participating in any game with a contribution profile where i 
contributes (up to) 6 tokens and j undercuts i’s contribution by one token. More generally, the higher the degree of 





APPENDIX B – EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS (common to all treatments) 
 
Welcome! You are about to take part in a decision-making experiment. This experiment is run by the Centre for 
Decision Research and Experimental Economics and has been financed by various research foundations. 
There are other people in this room, who are also participating in this experiment. Everyone is participating for the 
first time, and all participants are reading the same instructions. It is important that you do not communicate with 
any of the other participants during the experiment. If you have a question at any time, raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to your desk to answer it.  
This experiment consists of two parts: Part 1 and Part 2.  
In each part of the experiment you will be asked to make one or more decisions, and will have a chance to earn 
money. Decisions that will be made in one part of the experiment will not affect decisions or earnings in the other 
part of the experiment. 
You will be informed of any outcome (including your earnings) from Part 1 and Part 2 of the experiment only once 
everyone in the room has completed Part 2. Therefore everyone will make their decisions in Part 2 without knowing 
any outcome from Part 1. 
Only one part of the experiment will be taken into account in determining your final earnings from today’s 
experiment. At the end of Part 2, we will toss a fair coin. If the coin lands heads all participants in today’s 
experiment will be paid according to their earnings from Part 1. If the coin lands tails all participants in today’s 
experiment will be paid according to their earnings from Part 2. Your earnings will be paid out to you in private and 
in cash. 
Shortly, you will receive detailed instructions about Part 1 of the experiment. You will receive detailed instructions 
about Part 2 once everyone in the room has completed Part 1. 









Part 1 - Instructions (common to all treatments) 
General 
In this part of the experiment you will be paired with one other person, randomly selected from the participants in 
this room. At the end of Part 1 the pair will be dissolved, and you will not be matched with this person again during 
this experiment. 
Your earnings in Part 1 will only depend on your decisions and the decisions of the person you are paired with. All 
decisions are made anonymously and you will not learn the identity of the person you are paired with. 
Your earnings in Part 1 will be calculated in points. At the end of Part 1 your point earnings will be converted into 
cash at the exchange rate of 15 pence per point. If Part 1 is selected for payment, you will be paid this amount in 
private and in cash at the end of the experiment.  
 
The Decision Situation 
Your earnings in Part 1 of the experiment will depend on decisions made in the following decision situation. You 
will be in this decision situation only once (i.e. there is only one period in Part 1 of the experiment). 
There are two people involved in the decision situation: ‘Person A’ and ‘Person B’. Person A can choose between 
two options: IN or OUT.  
If Person A chooses OUT, Person B has no choice to make, and both Person A and Person B earn 50 points each.  
If Person A chooses IN, then Person B has a choice between two options: LEFT or RIGHT. If Person B chooses 
LEFT, both Person A and Person B earn 70 points each. If Person B chooses RIGHT, Person A earns 35 points and 
Person B earns 85 points. 















Person A earns 70 points 
Person B earns 70 points 
Person A earns 35 points 
Person B earns 85 points 
Person A earns 50 points 







How You Make Decisions 
You will make decisions on the computer by completing a screen. The attached sheet shows what the screen will 
look like. We want to know what you would do in the role of Person A and what you would do in the role of Person 
B. Thus you will be prompted to make decisions in both roles. Only after you have made your decisions will the 
computer determine your actual role, “Person A” or “Person B”, and this will determine your relevant decisions for 
calculating earnings. The computer will select roles randomly: there is a 50% chance you will be Person A and the 
person you are paired with will be Person B, and a 50% chance you will be Person B and the person you are paired 
with will be Person A. 
DECISION TASK 1: In the first input field you must make a decision in the role of Person A. You must choose 
between IN and OUT. 
DECISION TASK 2: In the second input field you must make a decision in the role of Person B. We want to know 
what you as Person B would do if Person A chooses IN. You must choose between LEFT and RIGHT. 
The screen also has a final input field for a PREDICTION TASK. Here you must enter a prediction about how 
many of the other participants in this room will choose RIGHT when they make a decision in the role of Person B.  
Once you have completed the decision and prediction tasks you should click on the “Submit” button. You will then 
be prompted to either change or confirm your decisions and predictions. At this point, if you want to you will be able 
to go back and change your entries. Once you confirm your decisions and predictions you cannot change them. 
When everyone in the room has submitted and confirmed their decisions and predictions earnings will be calculated. 
How Your Earnings Are Determined  
First the computer will randomly determine your actual role in the decision situation. This will determine which of 
your choices (in Decision Task 1 or in Decision Task 2) is relevant for the computation of earnings: 
 There is a 50% chance that you are Person A and the person you are paired with is Person B. In this case, your 
choice in Decision Task 1 and the other person’s choice in Decision Task 2 will be relevant.  
 There is a 50% chance that you are Person B and the person you are paired with is Person A. In this case, your 
choice in Decision Task 2 and the other person’s choice in Decision Task 1 will be relevant.  
The relevant decisions made by you and the person you are paired with will then be used to calculate earnings as 
shown in the Figure above.  
In addition, you can earn points from the PREDICTION TASK. Your prediction in the PREDICTION TASK will be 
compared with the actual number of participants who chose RIGHT in the role of Person B. If your prediction is 
correct you will receive 10 additional points. 
Your point earnings from the decision situation and the prediction task will then be summed and converted to cash at 
a rate of 15 pence per point. If Part 1 of the experiment is selected for payment, you will be paid this amount in 
private and cash at the end of the experiment. 
We now want to check that each participant understands how their earnings from Part 1 will be calculated. To do 
this we ask you to answer some questions. In a couple of minutes the experimenter will check your answers. When 





1. How many periods will there be in Part 1 of the experiment?    _______ 
2. How many other people are you matched with in Part 1 of the experiment?  _______ 
3. Suppose that the person you are paired with chooses OUT as Person A and RIGHT as Person B. Suppose you 
choose IN as Person A and LEFT as Person B. If the computer randomly determines that you are Person A and the 
person you are paired with is Person B …. 
What will be your earnings from the decision situation?    _______ 
What will be the other person’s earnings from the decision situation?   _______ 
4. Suppose that the person you are paired with chooses OUT as Person A and LEFT as Person B. Suppose you 
choose IN as Person A and RIGHT as Person B. If the computer randomly determines that you are Person B and the 
person you are paired with is Person A …. 
What will be your earnings from the decision situation?    _______ 
What will be the other person’s earnings from the decision situation?   _______ 
Beginning the Experiment  
If you have any questions please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your desk to answer it. 
We are now ready to begin Part 1 of the experiment. Please look at your computer screen and begin making your 
decisions. 
 




Part 2 - Instructions (differences between treatments in brackets) 
General  
In this part of the experiment you will be matched with one other person, randomly selected from the participants in 
this room, to form a group of two. At the end of Part 2 the group will be dissolved, and you will not be matched with 
this person again during this experiment. 
Your earnings in Part 2 will depend on the decisions made within your group, as described below. Your earnings 
will not be affected by decisions made in other groups. All decisions are made anonymously and you will not learn 
the identity of the other participant in your group. 
Your earnings in Part 2 will be calculated in points. At the end of Part 2 your point earnings will be converted into 
cash at the exchange rate of 15 pence per point. If Part 2 is selected for payment, you will be paid this amount in 
private and in cash at the end of the experiment.  
 
The Decision Situation 
Your earnings in Part 2 of the experiment will depend on the decisions made in the following decision situation. You 
will be in this decision situation only once (i.e. there is only one period in Part 2 of the experiment). 
At the beginning of the decision situation you will be endowed with 20 tokens. Similarly, the other member of your 
group will be endowed with 20 tokens. 
You can use these tokens to earn points in a Two-Person Task where you and the other group member have to make 
the following allocation decision. You must choose how many of your 20 tokens to allocate to a group account and 
how many to keep in your private account. At the same time that you are making your decision the other member of 
your group must choose how many of his or her 20 tokens to allocate to the group account and how many to keep in 
his or her private account. 
You will make your allocation decision on a screen like the one shown below. You must enter the number of tokens 
you allocate to the group account. Any tokens you do not allocate to the group account will automatically be kept in 






Your earnings will be determined as follows: 
For each token you keep in your private account you will earn 3 points. 
For each token you allocate to the group account you and the other member of your group will earn 2 points each. 
Similarly, for each token the other group member keeps in his or her private account he or she will earn 3 points, and 
for each token he or she allocates to the group account both group members will earn 2 points each. 
Your point earnings will be the sum of your earnings from your private account and the group account.  
Thus: 
Your point earnings in the Two-Person Task = 3 x (number of tokens kept in your private account) + 
2 x (total number of tokens allocated to the group account by yourself and the other member of your 
group). 
After you and the other group member have made a decision, you will be informed of the allocation decisions and 
earnings in your group. 
We now want to check that each participant understands how their earnings from the Two-Person Task will be 
calculated. To do this we ask you to answer some questions. You will find these on the next page. In a couple of 
minutes the experimenter will check your answers. When each participant has answered all questions correctly we 
will continue with the experiment. 
 
Questions 
1. How many periods will there be in Part 2 of the experiment?     _______ 
2. How many people are in your group (including yourself)?     _______ 
3. Suppose the other group member allocates 0 tokens to the group account. If you allocate 0 tokens to the group 
account …. 
How many tokens do you keep in your private account?     _______ 
What will be your earnings from your private account?     _______ 
What is the total number of tokens allocated to the group account?    _______ 
What will be your earnings from the group account?      _______ 
What will be your total earnings?        _______ 
4. Suppose the other group member allocates 20 tokens to the group account. If you allocate 20 tokens to the group 
account …. 
How many tokens do you keep in your private account?     _______ 
What will be your earnings from your private account?     _______ 
What is the total number of tokens allocated to the group account?    _______ 
What will be your earnings from the group account?      _______ 
What will be your total earnings?        _______ 
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5. Suppose the other group member allocates 2 tokens to the group account. If you allocate 18 tokens to the group 
account …. 
How many tokens do you keep in your private account?     _______ 
What will be your earnings from your private account?     _______ 
What is the total number of tokens allocated to the group account?    _______ 
What will be your earnings from the group account?      _______ 
What will be your total earnings?        _______ 
6. Suppose the other group member allocates 18 tokens to the group account. If you allocate 2 tokens to the group 
account …. 
How many tokens do you keep in your private account?     _______ 
What will be your earnings from your private account?     _______ 
What is the total number of tokens allocated to the group account?    _______ 
What will be your earnings from the group account?      _______ 




What happens next? 
In summary, the structure of Part 2 of the experiment is as follows: 
Step 1 - You will be randomly matched with another person in this room to form a group of two. You and the other 
group member will be endowed with 20 tokens each. 
Step 2 - You and the other group member will make an allocation decision in the Two-Person Task. You will choose 
how many of your tokens to allocate to a group account and how many to keep in your private account. You and the 
other group member will then be informed of the allocation decisions made in your group and the resulting earnings. 
Step 3 - Your point earnings from Part 2 will be converted to cash at a rate of 15 pence per point. If Part 2 of the 
experiment is selected for payment, you will be paid this amount in private and cash. 
Beginning the experiment 
If you have any questions please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your desk to answer it. 




Participation in the Two-Person Task is voluntary. If you do not wish to participate in the Two-Person Task you can 
opt for an Individual Task. In this case your 20 tokens will automatically be allocated to an individual account from 
which you earn 61 points in total. Similarly, the 20 tokens of the other group member will be allocated to his or her 
individual account from which he or she earns 61 points in total. 
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You and the other group member will choose whether to be paid according to the Two-Person Task or the Individual 
Task before you make an allocation decision in the Two-Person Task. 
If both you and the other group member choose the Two-Person Task, then you and the other group member will 
have to decide how to allocate your tokens between the group account and the private account, and your earnings 
will be calculated accordingly.  
If either you or the other group member chooses the Individual Task, you will not make an allocation decision in the 
Two-Person Task. Your 20 tokens will automatically be allocated to your individual account and your earnings will 
be 61 points. 
What happens next? 
In summary, the structure of Part 2 of the experiment is as follows: 
Step 1 - You will be randomly matched with another person in this room to form a group of two. You and the other 
group member will be endowed with 20 tokens each. 
Step 2 - You and the other group member will independently and privately choose whether to be paid according to 
the Two-Person Task or the Individual Task.  
Step 3 – If both you and the other group member choose the Two-Person Task, you and the other group member will 
make an allocation decision. You will choose how many of your tokens to allocate to a group account and how many 
to keep in your private account. You and the other group member will then be informed of the allocation decisions 
made in your group and the resulting earnings in Part 2 of the experiment. 
If either you or the other group member chooses the Individual Task, you will not make an allocation decision in 
Step 3. You and the other group member will earn 61 points each in Part 2 of the experiment.  
Step 4 - Your point earnings from Part 2 will be converted to cash at a rate of 15 pence per point. If Part 2 of the 
experiment is selected for payment, you will be paid this amount in private and cash. 
Beginning the experiment 
If you have any questions please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your desk to answer it. 




Participation in the Two-Person Task is voluntary. If you do not wish to participate in the Two-Person Task you can 
opt for an Individual Task. In this case your 20 tokens will automatically be allocated to an individual account from 
which you earn 61 points in total. Similarly, the 20 tokens of the other group member will be allocated to his or her 
individual account from which he or she earns 61 points in total. 
You and the other group member will choose whether to be paid according to the Two-Person Task or the Individual 
Task after you have made an allocation decision in the Two-Person Task and you have been informed of the 
decisions in your group and the corresponding earnings. 
If both you and the other group member choose the Two-Person Task, then your allocation decisions will be 
implemented and your earnings confirmed. 
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If either you or the other group member chooses the Individual Task, then your allocation decisions will not be 
implemented. Your 20 tokens will automatically be allocated to your individual account and your earnings will be 61 
points.  
What happens next? 
In summary, the structure of Part 2 of the experiment is as follows: 
Step 1 - You will be randomly matched with another person in this room to form a group of two. You and the other 
group member will be endowed with 20 tokens each. 
Step 2 - You and the other group member will make an allocation decision in the Two-Person Task. You will choose 
how many of your tokens to allocate to a group account and how many to keep in your private account. You and the 
other group member will then be informed of the allocation decisions made in your group and the resulting earnings. 
Step 3 - You and the other group member will independently and privately choose whether to be paid according to 
the Two-Person Task or the Individual Task. 
If both you and the other group member choose the Two-Person Task your allocation decisions in Step 2 will be 
implemented, and your earnings in Part 2 of the experiment will be as shown in Step 2.  
If either you or the other group member chooses the Individual Task, your allocation decisions in Step 2 will not be 
implemented. You and the other group member will earn 61 points each in Part 2 of the experiment. 
Step 4 - Your point earnings from Part 2 will be converted to cash at a rate of 15 pence per point. If Part 2 of the 
experiment is selected for payment, you will be paid this amount in private and cash.] 
Beginning the experiment 
If you have any questions please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your desk to answer it. 
We are now ready to begin Part 2 of the experiment. Please look at your computer screen and begin making your 
decisions.] 
 
 
